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Abstract Limiting the diffusion of information in social net-
works is important in viral marketing and computer security.
To achieve this, existing works aim to prevent the diffusion
of information to as many nodes as possible, by deleting a
given number of edges. Thus, they adopt a collective appro-
ach and quantify the impact of deletion on the graph, based
on the number of deleted edges.
In this work, we propose a selective approach which
quantifies the impact of edge deletion based on PageRank.
Our approach allows specifying the nodes to which informa-
tion diffusion should be prevented and their maximum allo-
wable activation probability. Furthermore, it performs edge
deletion while avoiding drastic changes to the ability of the
network to propagate information. To realize our approach,
we propose a measure that captures changes, caused by dele-
tion, to the PageRank distribution of the graph. Our measure
is called PageRank-Harm (PRH) and quantifies the contri-
bution of an incoming edge (ul, u) to the PageRank score of
the node u. Based on PRH , we define the following opti-
mization problem: Given a subset of nodes and a threshold,
find a subset of edges that has minimum PRH and whose
deletion limits the activation probability of each specified
node to at most the threshold.
We show that the problem can be modeled as a Submo-
dular Set Cover (SSC) problem and design an approxima-
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tion algorithm, based on the well-known approximation al-
gorithm for SSC. Furthermore, we develop an iterative heu-
ristic that has similar effectiveness but also enables signifi-
cant computational savings. Moreover, we propose a lazy
edge selection technique that is used to improve the effi-
ciency of both our approximation algorithm and the iterative
heuristic, without affecting their effectiveness. Experiments
on real and synthetic data show the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of our methods.
Keywords Information diffusion, Influence, Linear
threshold model, PageRank, Submodular Set Cover
1 Introduction
Social networks have become a ubiquitous communication
infrastructure, which enables the diffusion (propagation) of
information to a very large number of users. For instance,
social networks are used by businesses who promote pro-
ducts through viral marketing campaigns [11,17,24] but also
by malicious users who spread computer malware [25, 26,
40,43]. Therefore, controlling the diffusion of information is
becoming an important task in multiple domains, including
viral marketing and computer security. In the most common
setting, the diffusion starts from a small subset of users who
aim to activate their friends. The activated friends of these
users attempt to activate their own friends, and the diffusion
process proceeds similarly until no new users are activated.
The diffusing information comes in different forms, such as
a link to the website of a new product or to a malicious web-
site to download malware. Typically, the social network is
represented as a graph, the initial users correspond to a sub-
set of nodes called seeds, and the activation probabilities of
nodes are computed according to a diffusion model [24].
Recently, many works [25, 26, 38, 40] focused on limi-
ting the diffusion of potentially harmful information, by mo-
2 Grigorios Loukides, Robert Gwadera
difying the graph before the start of the diffusion process.
These works aim to find a subset of k edges, whose deletion
by a decision maker (operator) reduces the expected num-
ber of activated nodes at the end of the process (spread) as
much as possible. However, they consider a rather limited
setting, since they: (I) adopt a collective approach (i.e., as-
sume that the diffusing information can harm all users), and
(II) use the number of deleted edges to quantify the impact
of edge deletion on the graph.
In this work, we consider the problem of limiting infor-
mation diffusion through edge deletion, in a new setting.
Specifically, we propose a selective approach that allows
specifying the nodes to which information should not be
diffused (vulnerable nodes) and their maximum allowable
activation probability. This flexibility is important in mar-
keting when there are certain classes of users, based on de-
mographics, location, or health condition, that may be har-
med by the diffusing information about a product [19], or
form and spread negative opinions about it [9]. In addition,
our approach quantifies the impact of edge deletion on the
graph using PageRank [4, 6], a fundamental model of infor-
mation propagation based on network topology [3,42]. This
allows performing deletion while preserving the ability of
the network to propagate information. For example, when
applied to the graph of Fig. 1(a), our approach favors the de-
letion of the edge e3 instead of e1. The deletion of e3 allows
the propagation of information to more nodes (e.g., from the
vulnerable nodes u1, u2 to u8) and causes a smaller change
to the PageRank distribution of the graph, as can be seen in
Fig. 1(b).
Our approach reduces the activation probability Pv of
each vulnerable node v to at most a threshold maxP , while
aiming to preserve the PageRank distribution of the graph.
The activation probabilities are computed by the Linear Thre-
shold (LT) [24] model, a well-established model of the dif-
fusion of potentially harmful information [25, 26]. The LT
model captures the “threshold behavior” of users, in which
a user takes the action that has been taken by a sufficiently
large fraction of their friends. The thresholdmaxP is a sim-
ple, application-dependent measure of significance (alike the
minimum support threshold in pattern mining), which mo-
dels the maximum allowable activation probability for each
vulnerable node. The selection of maxP and of vulnerable
nodes is performed based on domain knowledge (e.g., cus-
tomer vulnerability analysis and policies [39]).
Enforcing our approach is challenging, because: (I) There
is an exponential number of edge subsets that can be deleted.
(II) There are dependencies between edges, which affect the
activation probability of nodes. Specifically, the deletion of
an edge (ul, u) reduces the activation probability of all non-
seed nodes reachable from u, because these nodes can no
longer be activated by a path that contains (ul, u). (III) Ex-
isting measures (e.g., L1 distance and KL-divergence) [4]
that quantify changes to the PageRank distribution cannot
be used as optimization criteria in efficient approximation
algorithms. In addition, our approach cannot be enforced by
existing methods [25,26] that limit the diffusion of informa-
tion under the LT model. This is because these methods may
not limit the activation probabilities of vulnerable nodes, or
they may substantially affect the information propagation on
the network. To illustrate this point, we provide Example 1,
where we apply the method of [25] with different k values.
This method aims to minimize the spread of the diffusing in-
formation (expected number of activated nodes), under the
LT model, by deleting an edge subset of given size k.
Example 1 Consider the graph of Fig. 1(a), where the seed
is s, and the vulnerable nodes are v1 and v2. The activation
probabilities Pv1 and Pv2 in the LT model are equal to 0.738
and 0.729, respectively, and they need to be limited to at
most 0.01. Applying the method of [25] with k = 1, deletes
e2 = (s, u1). This minimizes the spread. However, Pv1 and
Pv2 do not change, since all simple paths from s to v1 and to
v2 are preserved [17]. Thus, in this case, the method does not
limit the activation probabilities of vulnerable nodes to the
desired threshold. Using k = 2, results in deleting {e1, e2}.
This reduces Pv1 and Pv2 , to zero. However, no information
can be propagated from u1, u2, or u3 to the nodes on the
right of s. Thus, in this case, the edge deletion method of
[25] substantially affects the information propagation on the
network.
1.1 Contributions
The contributions of our work are summarized as follows.
First, we propose a measure that captures changes, cau-
sed by edge deletion, to the PageRank distribution. Our me-
asure, called PageRank-Harm (PRH), quantifies the contri-
bution of an incoming edge (ul, u) to the PageRank score of
the node u. Thus, it penalizes the deletion of the edge based
on the ratio between the PageRank score and out-degree of
the start node (see Eq. 1). For example, e1 = (s, u6) has a
larger PRH than e3 = (u6, u7) in Fig. 1(a), because s has
a larger PageRank score than u6 (see Fig. 1(b)) and s and
u6 have the same out-degree. Since the PageRank score of
each node is distributed equally into its out-neighbors, de-
leting an edge with large PRH incurs a substantial change
to the PageRank scores of many other nodes. For instance,
deleting e1 instead of e3 causes a larger change to the Page-
Rank scores of the nodes in Fig. 1(a), as shown in Fig. 1(b).
Since PageRank is computed recursively (see Eq. 1), these
changes propagate in the graph and may also affect the Pa-
geRank score of ul, due to paths from u to ul. However, as
we show, the impact of such changes is small in practice, be-
cause the change to the PageRank score of a node diminishes
exponentially with the length of the path from ul. Therefore,
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(b)
edge PRH gPv1 gPv2 gPv1,v2
e1 0.062 0.738 0.729 1.447
e2 0.062 0 0 0
e3 0.043 0.729 0.729 1.447
e4 0.036 0 0.729 0.719
e5 0.036 0.729 0 0.728
e6 0.043 0.009 0 0.009
e7 0.072 0.009 0 0.009
(c)
Algorithm Deleted edges PRH
AGDE e3 0.043
IGDE {e4, e5} 0.071
[25] k = 2 {e1, e2} 0.124
(d)
Fig. 1: (a) Graph and edge probabilities; s is a seed, and v1, v2 are vulnerable nodes. The method of [25] with k = 1 (resp.,
k = 2) deletes e2, (resp., {e1, e2}). (b) The PageRank distribution of the graph in Fig. 1(a) before and after deleting e1,
{e1, e2}, and e3. (c) PRH , path probability gain gPv1 and gPv2 used in IGDE, and aggregate path probability gain gPv1,v2
used in AGDE. (d) The deleted edges and PRH for AGDE, IGDE, and the method of [25] with k = 2, when applied to
Example 1.
PRH can be used as a heuristic to preserve the PageRank
distribution of the graph. In addition, we show that the PRH
measure can be incorporated into efficient approximation al-
gorithms.
Second, we formally define the optimization problem of
PageRank-preserving Edge Deletion (PED). The problem
requires finding an edge subset whose deletion: (I) minimi-
zes changes to the PageRank distribution of the graph ac-
cording to PRH , and (II) limits the activation probability
of each vulnerable node to at most maxP . We also prove
that PED is NP-hard.
Third, we show that PED, for a single vulnerable node,
can be modeled as a Submodular Set Cover (SSC) [14, 41]
problem. This allows developing an approximation algorithm
based on the well-known logarithmic approximation algo-
rithm for SSC [41]. Our algorithm, called Greedy Delete
Edges (GDE), finds an edge subset iteratively. In each ite-
ration, it selects the edge with the minimum ratio between
PRH and path probability gain, which quantifies the bene-
fit of selecting the edge in terms of decreasing the activation
probability Pv of the vulnerable node. The objective is to
select an edge that decreases Pv without substantially af-
fecting PageRank. When the deletion of the selected edges
can limit Pv to at most maxP , these edges are deleted and
the algorithm stops. GDE finds an edge subset whose PRH
is larger than that of the optimal solution by at most a lo-
garithmic factor, which depends on the PRH and the path
probability gain of the subset.
Fourth, we propose two algorithms for PED, when there
are multiple vulnerable nodes. The first is an approximation
algorithm, called Aggregate Greedy Delete Edges (AGDE).
AGDE differs from GDE in the following aspects: (I) It
uses aggregate path probability. This function allows deter-
mining when the activation probability of each vulnerable
node does not exceed maxP , and it is used in the stopping
criterion of AGDE. (II) It uses the gain in aggregate path
probability after selecting an edge (aggregate path proba-
bility gain) in its edge selection criterion. Aggregate path
probability gain quantifies the benefit of selecting the edge
in terms of decreasing the activation probability of all vul-
nerable nodes whose activation probability exceeds maxP
simultaneously. AGDE achieves a logarithmic approxima-
tion ratio, which depends on the PRH and the aggregate
path probability gain of the selected edges. Our experiments
show that AGDE finds near-optimal solutions (see Fig. 5a).
The second algorithm, Iterative Greedy Delete Edges (IGDE),
iterates over the vulnerable nodes, in decreasing order of
their activation probability, and applies GDE to approximate
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the PED problem for one vulnerable node per iteration. As
a heuristic to minimize the number of deleted edges, IGDE
deals with nodes with large activation probability first. Such
nodes “cover” many other vulnerable nodes, because they
typically require deleting many edges and the deletion of
an edge (ul, u) reduces the activation probability of all vul-
nerable nodes reachable from u. IGDE is up to two orders
of magnitude faster than AGDE, because the deleted edges
in an iteration are not considered again, and it produces so-
lutions of similar quality, as shown in our experiments. To
illustrate AGDE and IGDE, we provide Example 2.
Example 2 AGDE and IGDE were applied to Example 1,
using maxP = 0.01. AGDE selected the edge e3 in Fig.
1(a), which has the minimum ratio between PRH and ag-
gregate path probability gain gPv1,v2 (see Fig. 1(c)). The de-
letion of e3 limits Pv1 and Pv2 to at most 0.01, thus AGDE
deleted e3. IGDE considered v1 first, since Pv1 is larger
than Pv2 , and selected e5. This is because e5 has the mi-
nimum ratio between PRH and path probability gain gPv1
among the edges {e1, e3, e5, e6, e7}, whose deletion decre-
ases Pv1 (see Fig. 1(c)). The deletion of e5 limits Pv1 to at
most 0.01, thus IGDE deleted e5. Then, IGDE considered
v2 and deleted e4. The deletion of {e4, e5} limits both Pv1
and Pv2 to at most 0.01. As shown in Fig. 1(d), the soluti-
ons of IGDE and the method of [25] with k = 2 have 65%
and 186% larger PRH than that of the solution of AGDE,
respectively.
Fifth, we propose a lazy edge selection technique that
is used to improve the efficiency of all our algorithms. The
technique is inspired by the Accelerated Greedy (also refer-
red to as Lazy Greedy) algorithm [34], and it is based on
the submodularity of the functions that are used in the edge
selection criteria of our algorithms. The lazy edge selection
technique enables our algorithms to find the edge with the
minimum ratio, while substantially reducing the number of
edges that are considered for being selected. Thus, lazy edge
selection does not affect the quality of the solutions of the
algorithms, while it substantially improves their runtime. In
our experiments, we report at least 37% and up to 814% lo-
wer runtime for the AGDE algorithm and at least 15% and
up to 87% lower runtime for the IGDE algorithm.
1.2 Paper organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides the background. Section 3 introduces the PRH me-
asure. Section 4 presents the PED problem. Sections 5 and
6 present our algorithms. Section 7 our lazy edge selection
technique. Section 8 presents the experimental evaluation.
Section 9 discusses related work. Section 10 concludes the
paper.
2 Background
This section presents necessary concepts that are used in
our approach, including PageRank [6], the Linear Threshold
model [24], and the Accelerated Greedy algorithm [34].
2.1 Preliminaries
Let G(V,E) be a directed graph. V is a set of nodes of
size |V |, and E is a set of edges of size |E|. The set of in-
neighbors of a node u is denoted with n−(u) and has size
|n−(u)|, which is referred to as the in-degree of u. The set
of out-neighbors of u is denoted with n+(u) and has size
|n+(u)|, which is referred to as the out-degree of u.
A path q = [(u1, u2), . . . , (um−1, u)] is an ordered set of
edges, which has length |q| = m−1. A path q in which each
node, u1, . . . , u, is unique (i.e., a path with no cycle) is a
simple path. A path that starts and ends at the same node is a
cycle path. We assume simple paths, unless stated otherwise.
Let R and R′ be probability distributions represented
with the probability vectors (r1, . . . , rm) and (r′1, . . . , r
′
m),
respectively. The distance between the probability distribu-
tions R and R′ can be quantified using the KL-divergence
or the L1 distance. The L1 distance quantifies the absolute
error between the distributions R and R′ as L1(R,R′) =∑
i∈[1,m] |ri − r′i|, and it is typically used to measure dis-
tance between PageRank distributions [4]. The L1 distance
also forms the basis of the following measures: (I) theGower
distance, which is defined asGower(R,R′) = 1m ·L1(R,R′),
and (II) the Average Relative Error (ARE), which is defined
as ARE(R,R′) = 1m ·
∑
i∈[1,m]
|ri−r′i|
ri
.
Let U be a universe of elements and 2U its power set.
A set function f : 2U → R is non-decreasing, if f(X) ≤
f(Y ) for all subsets X ⊆ Y ⊆ U , monotone, if f(X) ≤
f(X ∪ u) for each u /∈ X , and submodular, if it satisfies
the diminishing returns property f(X ∪ {u}) − f(X) ≥
f(Y ∪{u})−f(Y ), for all X ⊆ Y ⊆ U and any u ∈ U \Y
[27].
2.2 PageRank
PageRank [6] is a well-established model of information
propagation based on network topology [3, 42]. The Page-
Rank score of a node u of a graph G is:
PR(u,G) = α|V | + (1− α) ·
∑
ul∈n−(u)
PR(ul,G)
|n+(ul)| (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the restart probability, which is usually
set to 0.15 [4]. Eq. 1 assumes that each node has out-degree
at least 1 (i.e., there are no dangling nodes). If there are dan-
gling nodes, we treat them as in [29]. That is, an artificial
edge is added between each dangling node and each node
of G, including the dangling node itself. For simplicity of
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presentation, we henceforth assume that G does not contain
dangling nodes. We will write PR(u) for PR(u,G), when
G is clear from the context. The PageRank distribution of
the graph G is denoted with PR(G), and it is defined as the
vector of the PageRank scores of all nodes of G [4].
2.3 The Linear Threshold (LT) model
We now review the Linear Threshold (LT) model following
[24]. The edge probability of an edge (ul, u) is denoted with
p((ul, u)) and reflects how likely a node u that has not been
activated before is activated by its active in-neighbor ul. For
each node u, it holds that
∑
ul∈n−(u) p((ul, u)) ≤ 1 1. The
path probability of a path q = [(u1, u2), . . . , (um−1, u)] is
defined as P (q) =
∏
e∈q p(e) and reflects how likely u is
activated by u1 through q.
Let S ⊆ V be the set of seeds. Let also Qs,u be the set
of paths from a seed s to a non-seed node u of G that do not
pass through another seed, andQS,u = ∪s∈SQs,u. The acti-
vation probability of u byQS,u is computed asP(u,QS,u) =∑
q∈QS,u P (q), where P (q) is the path probability of a path
q in QS,u [17]. We denote P(u,QS,u) with Pu, when QS,u
is clear from the context. We also define the activation graph
G˜u of u as the subgraph of G which is induced by the edges
of all paths in QS,u.
The exact computation of Pu is a #P -hard problem for
general graphs [11]. However, the path probability often de-
creases exponentially with the path length, because the edge
probabilities of most paths are uniformly bounded away from
1 [11]. Thus, Pu can be estimated accurately and efficiently,
based on the subset of paths inQS,u whose seeds are “close”
to u [17]. To find these paths, we adapt the depth-first-search-
based algorithm of [17]. For each seed, the algorithm itera-
tively extends each path from the seed and prunes it, if its
path probability is lower than a threshold h. Then, Pu is
computed based on the paths from seeds to u that are found
by the algorithm, and G˜u is constructed as the graph indu-
ced by the edges of these paths. The threshold h ∈ [0, 1]
represents the maximum tolerable estimation error and is
operator-specified [17]. The impact of the threshold h on
our approach is studied in Section 8.
2.4 Accelerated greedy
The Accelerated Greedy algorithm [34] is an approximation
algorithm for finding a subset of r elements whose value in
a submodular function is maximum. Formally, given a uni-
verse of elements U , a monotone non-decreasing submodu-
lar function f : 2U → R, and an integer r, the Accelerated
1 The restriction provided in [24] allows u to remain inactive, after
each of its active in-neighbors has attempted to activate u.
Greedy algorithm [34] finds a subset U ′ ⊆ U such that:
(I) f(U ′) ≥ (1 − 1e ) · f(U ′OPT ), and (II) |U ′| = r, where
U ′OPT ⊆ U is the subset of U with the maximum value in f
and size r, and e is the base of the natural logarithm [34]. In
each iteration, the algorithm selects the element of U with
the maximum marginal gain (i.e., the element u that causes
the largest increase f(U ′ ∪ {u})− f(U ′), after being added
into U ′), which is found efficiently using a priority queue.
The priority queue is initialized with the marginal gain of
each element and is sorted in decreasing order. In the first
iteration, the top entry is removed from the queue and its
corresponding element, u1, is added into the subset U ′. In
the second iteration, the top entry of the queue (i.e., the se-
cond topmost entry in the previous iteration) is updated to
reflect the addition of u1 into U ′. If the entry stays on the top
of the queue (i.e., it still has the largest marginal gain), it is
removed from the queue and its corresponding element, u2,
is added into U ′. This is because, after the update, the margi-
nal gain of u2 is at least equal to that of any node in U \U ′,
and, due to submodularity, the marginal gain of any node
in U \U ′ cannot increase. Otherwise, the algorithm updates
the current top entry and repeats the process. After adding an
element into U ′, Accelerated Greedy proceeds into the next
iteration, which is similar to the second one. In practice, the
number of queue updates performed is small, which makes
the algorithm efficient, as reported in [10, 30, 31].
3 The PRH measure
The deletion of an edge affects the PageRank score of the
end node of the deleted edge, according to Eq. 1. In ad-
dition, the PageRank score of this node is distributed into
its out-neighbors. Thus, the PageRank scores of these no-
des change, and the change is propagated similarly. There-
fore, edge deletion may incur a substantial change to the
PageRank distribution. Minimizing the change in our pro-
blem is challenging, because there are O(2|E|) edge sub-
sets that need to be considered, to select the one that cau-
ses the minimum change to the PageRank distribution and
reduces the activation probability of each vulnerable node
to at most maxP . However, the number of edge subsets
that are considered can be reduced to O(|E|2), by obser-
ving that the problem is similar to the Submodular Set Cover
(SSC) problem [41] (a formal reduction will be presented in
Section 5). SSC can be efficiently solved using a greedy ap-
proach [41]. In the case of our problem, the subset of edges
E′ ⊆ E to be deleted is constructed iteratively by the greedy
approach. That is, the edge e that minimizes the ratio of: (I)
the distance between PR(G′1) and PR(G
′
2), where G
′
1 (re-
spectively, G′2) is produced from the graph G by deleting
E′ (respectively, E′∪e), and (II) aggregate path probability
gain is iteratively added into E′ . The objective is to select
edges whose deletion incurs a small change to the PageRank
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distribution and a large reduction in the activation probabi-
lity of vulnerable nodes. By favoring edges that incur a large
reduction in activation probability, it also tends to select a
small number of edges.
The greedy approach can employ different measures to
quantify the distance between PR(G′1) and PR(G
′
2), such
as the L1 distance, the Gower distance, ARE, and KL-
divergence. However, it does not offer approximation gua-
rantees when it employs either of these measures. This is
because the greedy approach offers approximation guaran-
tees, only when it employs a monotone measure2 [41], whe-
reas the measures L1 distance, Gower distance, ARE, and
KL-divergence are not monotone, as shown in Example 3.
Example 3 The subgraphs G′1 and G
′
2 of the graph G in
Fig. 1(a) are produced by deleting E′ = {e1} and E′ ∪
e2 = {e1, e2}, respectively. The distance between PR(G)
andPR(G′1) is higher than that betweenPR(G) andPR(G
′
2),
according to each of the measures in Fig. 2. Since e2 /∈ E′
and the value of each of the measures in Fig. 2 for E′ is
larger than the value for E′ ∪ e2, these measures are not
monotone.
Subgraph Deleted edges L1 Gower ARE KL-divergence
G′1 E
′ = {e1} 0.347 0.032 0.341 0.126
G′2 E
′ ∪ e2 = {e1, e2} 0.188 0.017 0.178 0.051
Fig. 2: Existing measures favor the deletion of the edgesE′∪
e2 = {e1, e2} instead of E′ = {e1} from G in Fig. 1(a).
Therefore, we propose PRH , a monotone measure that
can be used by the greedy approach to produce approxima-
tely optimal solutions. In Section 3.1, we define the PRH
of an edge e = (u, u′). In Section 3.2, we show that the the
deletion of e has a small impact on the PageRank scores of
nodes that are far away from u.
In Section 3.3, we define the PRH of a subset of edges,
based on the observation that the dependencies among the
PRH of these edges are weak. That is, the deletion of an
edge e = (u, u′) does not substantially affect the PRH of
another edge e′ = (u˜1, u˜2) in the subset. Specifically, we
show that the change to the PageRank score of u˜1 decreases
exponentially with the length of the path from u to u˜1.
3.1 The PRH of a single edge
The PRH of an edge e = (u, u′) is defined as PRH(e) =
(1 − α) · PR(u,G)|n+(u)| , where PR(u,G) is the PageRank score
of u in G, |n+(u)| is the out-degree of u, and α is the re-
start probability of Eq. 1. Since α is a constant [6], the term
2 The value of a monotone measure for the deletion of E′ cannot be
larger than that for the deletion of E′ ∪ e.
(1 − α) in PRH(e) is the same for every edge e and can
be omitted. We retain this term to highlight the fact that
PRH(e) is exactly the contribution of the incoming edge
e = (u, u′) to the PageRank score of the node u′ (i.e., the
PageRank “mass” that the edge e passes to u′), according to
Eq. 1.
Intuitively, when the edge e = (u, u′) has a large PRH ,
it “passes” a large PageRank mass from u to u′. This is
because a large PRH(e) implies that the PageRank score
PR(u,G) of u is large and/or its out-degree |n+(u)| is small.
Thus, deleting e changes the PageRank scores of the out-
neighbors of u. In addition, the change propagates in the
graph and may incur a large change (increase or decrease)
to the PageRank scores of other nodes, due to paths to these
nodes that start from u [2, 13].
3.2 Impact of deleting a single edge on PageRank
In the following, we examine the impact of deleting an edge
e = (u, u′) on the PageRank score of a node u∗ in detail.
Our objective is to show that the effect of edge deletion has a
small impact on nodes that are far away from u. Thus, PRH
can capture the change to the PageRank scores of most no-
des effectively, which makes it a good heuristic to capture
changes to the PageRank distribution of the graph.
Let δ(u∗) = PR(u∗, G)−PR(u∗, G′) be the change to
the PageRank score of u∗, when the deletion of the edge
e = (u, u′) from G produces G′. We show that δ∗ hea-
vily depends on PRH(e), which implies that deleting edges
with small PRH(e) can be used as a heuristic to preserve
the PageRank distribution of the graph. Specifically, there
are two cases when the edge e is deleted, which are illustra-
ted in Fig. 3:
I u∗ is an out-neighbor of u, and
(a) u∗ = u′, or (b) u∗ 6= u′.
II u∗ is not an out-neighbor of u.
We now consider these cases in detail.
Case I Consider the case I(a). Before the deletion of e,
the contribution of e to PR(u∗) was (1 − α) · PR(u,G)|n+(u)| =
PRH(e), according to Eq. 1. However, after deleting e, u
is no longer an in-neighbor of u∗. Thus, the contribution
of e to PR(u∗) is zero. Now consider the case I(b). The
deletion of e reduces the out-degree of the node u by one.
Thus, the contribution of (u, u∗) to PR(u∗) changes from
(1−α) · PR(u,G)|n+(u)| to (1−α) · PR(u,G
′)
|n+(u)|−1 . However, in either
case, u∗ may have a set of in-neighbors other than u, which
is denoted with UL (see Figs. 3I(a) and 3I(b)).
Therefore, δ(u∗) is computed as in Eq. 2:
δ(u∗) =

PRH(e) + (1− α) ·
∑
ul∈UL
δ(ul)
|n+(ul)|
, u∗ = u′
PRH(e)− (1− α) · PR(u,G′)|n+(u)|−1 + (1− α) ·
∑
ul∈UL
δ(ul)
|n+(ul)|
, u∗ 6= u′
(2)
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Fig. 3: Cases that summarize the relation between δ(u∗) and PRH(e). The deleted edge e is in bold, UL is the set of
in-neighbors of u∗, and nodes and edges that are not shown are denoted with “. . .”.
where δ(ul) is the change to the PageRank score of a node ul
in UL, and α is the restart probability of Eq. 2. The proof of
Eq. 2 follows easily from Eq. 1 and the definition of PRH ,
and it is omitted.
Case II The deletion of e changes the PageRank scores of
the out-neighbors of u, according to Case I (see Figs. 3II(a)
and II(b)), and the change is propagated to other nodes simi-
larly. In particular, δ(u∗) is computed using Eq. 3:
δ(u∗) = (1− α) ·∑ul∈n−(u∗) δ(ul)|n+(ul)| (3)
which follows from Eq. 2, when u is not an in-neighbor
of u∗. Eq. 3 is computed backwards recursively to the out-
neighbors of u.
Thus, in Cases I and II, δ(u∗) is determined by PRH(e)
and/or by the change to PR(u∗), caused by the incoming
edges to u∗. Furthermore, the change incurred by an edge
(ul, u
∗) decreases exponentially with the length of the path
from u to ul. Specifically, given a simple path
q = [(u, u′), (u′, u′2) . . . , (u
′
|q|−1, ul)]
(see Fig. 3II(a)), we obtain Eq. 4:
δ(ul) = (1− α)|q|−1 · δ(u
′)
|n+(u′)|·∏|q|−1r=2 |n+(u′r)| (4)
by recursively applying Eq. 3 for δ(ul) over u′|q|−1, . . . , u
′
2.
The case of a path q containing a cycle is similar (omitted).
Therefore, δ(ul) diminishes as we move away from u, and
δ(u∗) heavily depends on PRH(e) in most cases. Conse-
quently, PRH is an effective heuristic to capture changes,
caused by edge deletion, to the PageRank scores of nodes.
3.3 The PRH of a subset of edges
We define the PRH of an edge subset E′ ⊆ E as
PRH(E′) =
∑
e∈E′
PRH(e)
where e is an edge in E′ that starts from a node u of G and
PRH(e) = (1− α) · PR(u,G)|n+(u)| . Clearly, PRH is monotone
since PRH(E′) ≤ PRH(E′ ∪ e′), for each edge e′ /∈ E′.
The PRH of each edge in E′ is computed based on the
graphG. This strategy allows our approach to select an edge
efficiently, without computing the PageRank distribution of
the graph that is produced by the deletion of the currently se-
lected edges. Furthermore, the strategy is effective, because
the deletion of a currently selected edge e = (u, u′) does not
substantially affect the PRH of another edge e′ = (u˜1, u˜2).
This is because δ(u˜1) decreases exponentially with the
length of the path from u to u˜1, since δ(u˜1) is computed by
applying Eq. 4 for ul = u˜1. Thus, δ(u˜1) is a small fraction
of δ(u∗), which is already small, since δ(u∗) depends on
PRH(e) and our approach selects edges with small PRH .
In Section 8, we show that our PRH computation strategy
is much more efficient and equally effective as the alterna-
tive strategy, which computes PRH(e) on the graph that is
produced from G by deleting the currently selected edges.
4 Problem definition
The PED problem is defined as follows.
Problem 1 (PageRank-preserving Edge Deletion (PED))
Given a graph G(V,E), a threshold maxP in [0, 1], a set
of seed nodes S and a set of vulnerable nodes D, such that
S,D ⊆ V and S ∩ D = ∅, and the PRH of each edge
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e ∈ E, find an edge subset E′ ⊆ E, so that the following
two conditions hold:
(I) PRH(E′) is minimum, and
(II) the activation probability Pv ≤ maxP , for each node
v ∈ D, after the deletion of E′ from G.
The problem requires finding an edge subsetE′ with mi-
nimum PRH , whose deletion limits the activation probabi-
lity Pv of each vulnerable node v to at most maxP . We
assume that the activation probability Pv , before edge dele-
tion, is larger than maxP , for each vulnerable node v in D.
If this condition is not satisfied, v is excluded from D. We
also assume that the operator selects the seeds (e.g., using
existing methods [17, 24]), as well as the threshold maxP
and the vulnerable nodes, based on domain knowledge (e.g.,
customer vulnerability analysis and policies [39]). In addi-
tion, the operator computes the PRH of each edge. The
PED problem is NP-hard, as shown in Theorem 1. Varia-
tions of the PED problem that use a fixed maxP = 0, or
multiple thresholds, are easily dealt with by our algorithms.
Theorem 1 PED is NP-hard.
Proof. The proof is by reducing the NP-hard Weighted Set
Cover (WSC) problem [12] to PED. The WSC problem is
defined as follows. Given a collection L = {L1, . . . , Lm} of
sets, such that each Lj ∈ L has a nonnegative weight w(Lj)
and ∪Lj∈LLj = U = {u1, . . . , un}, find a subcollection
L′ ⊆ L that (I) covers all elements of U (i.e., ∪Lj∈L′Lj =
U ), and (II) has minimum
∑
Lj∈L′ w(Lj).
We map a given instance IWSC of WSC to an instance
IPED of PED, in polynomial time, as follows (see Fig. 4):
(I) Each subset Lj ∈ L is mapped to [sj , xj , (sj , xj)], where sj is a
seed, xj is a non-seed node, and (sj , xj) is an edge.
(II) Each element ui in each Lj ∈ L is mapped to [xj , ui, (xj , ui)],
where ui is a vulnerable node and (xj , ui) is an edge.
(III) We assign PRH to edges as follows: PRH((sj , xj)) = w(Lj)
and PRH((xj , ui)) = ∞, to force the algorithm for PED to se-
lect (sj , xj), which corresponds to Lj , and prevent the selection
of (xj , ui).
(IV) We assign edge probabilities as follows: p((sj , xj)) = 1 and
p((xj , ui)) =
1
|n−(ui)| , to ensure that the path probability of
[(sj , xj), (xj , ui)] is determined by |n−(ui)|, which corresponds
to the frequency of the element ui over the subsets of L (number
of subsets containing ui).
(V) We set maxP = 1 − 1
maxui |n−(ui)|
, so that at least one path
[(sj , xj), (xj , ui)] to each ui is disconnected after the deletion of
the selected edges by the algorithm for PED. This corresponds to
covering each element ui ∈ U by at least one subset Lj .
In the following, we prove the correspondence between
a solution L′ to the given instance IWSC and a solution E′
to the instance IPED.
We first prove that, ifL′ is a solution to IWSC , thenE′ is
a solution to IPED. Since ∪Lj∈L′Lj = U = {u1, . . . , un},
the deletion of E′ disconnects at least one path to each ui,
Fig. 4: The graph created from an instance of the WSC pro-
blem. The seeds are s1, . . . , sm and the vulnerable nodes
are u1, . . . , un. The edge probability (resp. PRH) appears
above (resp. below) the edges.
i ∈ [1, n], and Pui ≤ maxP holds, for each ui. Since∑
Lj∈L′ w(Lj) is minimum, PRH(E
′) =
∑
Lj∈L′ w(Lj)
is minimum. Thus, E′ is a solution to IPED.
We now prove that, if an edge subset E′ is a solution to
IPED, then L′ is a solution to IWSC . Since E′ is a solution
to IPED, at least one path to each ui is disconnected, and
Pui ≤ maxP holds for each ui, i ∈ [1, n]. Thus, L′ sa-
tisfies ∪Lj∈L′Lj = {u1, . . . , un} = U . Since PRH(E′) =∑
Lj∈L′ w(Lj) is minimum,L
′ has minimum
∑
Lj∈L′ w(Lj).
Thus, L′ is a solution to IWSC .
5 Addressing PED for a single vulnerable node
This section details our methodology for addressing PED,
when there is a single vulnerable node v. The main idea is
to model PED as a Submodular Set Cover (SSC) [14, 41]
problem and to develop an algorithm for PED based on the
approximation algorithm for SSC [41]. Our algorithm is cal-
led GDE and is applied to the activation graph G˜v of v. The
use of G˜v improves efficiency, since only edges that affect
the activation probability of v are considered (see Section
2.3).
Modeling PED as SSC. We show that PED, for a single
vulnerable node, can be modeled as an SSC problem, by me-
ans of a reduction. We first provide the definition of the SSC
problem [14] and then a formulation of PED based on SSC,
which is referred to as PEDSSC and is used in the reduction.
After that, we present the reduction from PEDSSC to SSC.
Definition 1 (Submodular Set Cover (SSC) [14]) Let U
be a universe of elements and c(u) be the nonnegative cost
of an element u of U . Let also C be a function defined as
C(S) =∑u∈S c(u), for a subset S of U , and F be a mono-
tone non-decreasing submodular function. Given a nonnega-
tive constant b, find a subset S ⊆ U , so that the following
two conditions hold:
(I) the cost C(S) is minimum, and
(II) F (S) ≥ b.
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The PEDSSC problem is defined as follows.
Problem 2 (PEDSSC) Given a threshold maxP in [0, 1], a
set of seed nodes S, a vulnerable node v, the activation graph
G˜v , and the PRH of each edge of G˜v , find an edge sub-
set E′ ⊆ E of G˜v , such that: (I) PRH(E′) is minimum,
and (II) P(v,QS,v, E) − P(v,QS,v, E′) ≤ maxP , where
P(v,QS,v, E) (resp., P(v,QS,v, E′)) is the activation pro-
bability of v by the paths of QS,v that contain edges in E
(resp., in E′).
Both SSC and PEDSSC are constrained optimization pro-
blems, in which the objective function (i.e., the function C
in SSC and the function PRH in PEDSSC) is a monotone li-
near function. In addition, the constraint function, F , in SSC
is monotone non-decreasing submodular.
As we will show later, the reduction requires to map
an instance of PEDSSC to an instance of SSC. This is pos-
sible when: (I) the PRH function is monotone and linear
(as the function C in SSC), and (II) the constraint function,
P(v,QS,v, E′), in PEDSSC is monotone non-decreasing sub-
modular (as the function F in SSC). Clearly, PRH is mo-
notone and linear. To show that P(v,QS,v, E′) is monotone
non-decreasing submodular, we provide Theorem 2. Intuiti-
vely, the submodularity property holds, because the addition
of an edge e into E′ increases P(v,QS,v, E′) by the sum of
the path probabilities of paths that contain e and no other
edge in E′. Thus, the increase caused by adding e into E′
is at least equal to the increase to P(v,QS,v, E′′) caused by
adding e into a superset E′′ of E′.
Theorem 2 The function P(v,QS,v, E′) is monotone non-
decreasing submodular.
Proof: Let Ev be the edge set of G˜v , E1 ⊆ E2 ⊆ Ev be
subsets of Ev , and e be an edge in Ev \E2. Let also QE1S,v ⊆
QS,v and QE2S,v ⊆ QS,v be the set of paths containing edges
in E1 and E2, respectively, and QeS,v ⊆ QS,v be the set of
paths containing e. We will show that Eq. 5 holds in each of
the following cases.
P(v,QS,v, E1 ∪ e)− P(v,QS,v, E1) ≥
P(v,QS,v, E2 ∪ e)− P(v,QS,v, E2)
(5)
Case I: All paths in QeS,v are contained in Q
E1
S,v . Thus,
P(v,QS,v, E1 ∪ e)− P(v,QS,v, E1) = 0 ≥
P(v,QS,v, E2 ∪ e)− P(v,QS,v, E2) = 0
since adding e does not change QE1S,v and Q
E2
S,v .
Case II: All paths in QeS,v are contained in Q
E2
S,v and at least
one path is not contained in QE1S,v . Thus,
P(v,QS,v, E1 ∪ e)− P(v,QS,v, E1) ≥
P(v,QS,v, E2 ∪ e)− P(v,QS,v, E2) = 0
since adding e adds paths into QE1S,v only.
Case III: At least one path in QeS,v is not contained in Q
E2
S,v .
Thus,
P(v,QS,v, E1 ∪ e)− P(v,QS,v, E1) ≥
P(v,QS,v, E2 ∪ e)− P(v,QS,v, E2)
since adding e adds into QE1S,v all the paths that are added
into QE2S,v and the paths of Q
e
S,v contained in Q
E2
S,v \QE1S,v .
Consequently, Eq. 5 holds in each case andP(v,QS,v, E′)
is submodular. In addition,P(v,QS,v, E′) is monotone, since
P(v,QS,v, E′) ≤ P(v,QS,v, E′ ∪ e) for each e /∈ E′, and
non-decreasing, sinceP(v,QS,v, E1) ≤ P(v,QS,v, E2).
We now present the reduction from PEDSSC to SSC.
Theorem 3 PEDSSC can be reduced to SSC.
Proof. We provide a reduction from PEDSSC to SSC, by de-
fining a pair of polynomial-time computable functions (f, g),
such that: (I) f maps any given instance IPEDSSC of PEDSSC
to an instance ISSC of SSC, and (II) g maps any feasi-
ble solution S of ISSC to back to a feasible solution E′
of IPEDSSC , while preserving the approximation ratio (i.e.,
the approximation ratio of S with respect to ISSC is the
same as that of E′ with respect to IPEDSSC ).
The function f gets as input any instance IPEDSSC of
PEDSSC and constructs an instance ISSC of SSC, in poly-
nomial time, as follows: (I) for each edge e with PRH(e)
in the activation graph G˜v , it adds into the universe U an
element u with cost c(u) = PRH(e), (II) it defines the
function F (S) = P(v,QS,v, E′), where E′ is the edge sub-
set corresponding to S ⊆ U , and (III) it sets b = P(v,QS,v, E)
−maxP . The function g gets as input any feasible solu-
tion S of ISSC and constructs a feasible solution E′ of
IPEDSSC , in polynomial time, by adding into E′ the ed-
ges that correspond to the elements of S. Note that E′ is a
solution of IPEDSSC . This is because F (S) ≥ b implies
P(v,QS,v, E′) ≥ P(v,QS,v, E) − maxP , which implies
P(v,QS,v, E)− P(v,QS,v, E′) ≤ maxP . In addition,
PRH(E′) = C(S), which implies that the approximation
ratio of S with respect to ISSC is the same as that ofE′ with
respect to IPEDSSC .
Greedy Delete Edges (GDE). Since PEDSSC can be mo-
deled as an SSC problem, we can obtain an approximate so-
lution to PEDSSC using the algorithm of [41]. This algorithm
iteratively adds the element u ∈ U \S with the minimum ra-
tio c(u)F (S∪u)−F (S) into S, until F (S) ≥ b. That is, we can cre-
ate an instance of SSC from a given instance of PEDSSC, use
the algorithm of [41] to obtain a solution to the instance of
SSC and then map back the solution to a solution of PEDSSC,
as in the proof of Theorem 3. We do not describe this pro-
cess in detail, for clarity. Instead, in the following, we write
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the GDE algorithm “around” the algorithm of [41]. That is,
GDE employs the same element selection and stopping cri-
terion as the algorithm of [41] but uses the terminology for
PEDSSC.
Algorithm: GDE
Input: Graph G, activation graph G˜v , threshold maxP , PageRank
distribution PR(G), restart probability α
Output: Set of edges E′
1 foreach edge e = (u, u′) of G˜v do
2 PRH(e)← (1− α) · PR(u)|n+(u)|
3 E′ ← ∅
4 while P(v,QS,v , E)− P(v,QS,v , E′) > maxP do
5 Reconstruct G˜v and find an edge e of G˜v s.t. gP(e) > 0 and
PRH(e)
gP(e)
is minimum
6 E′ ← E′ ∪ e
7 Delete E′ from G
8 return E′
GDE is applied to the activation graph G˜v of v and
constructs the subset of edges E′ to be deleted iteratively.
As can be seen in the pseudocode, the algorithm compu-
tes the PRH of each edge in G˜v (steps 1-2) and constructs
E′, based on a similar criterion to that of the algorithm of
[41] (steps 4-6). That is, it selects the edge e with the mini-
mum ratio PRH(e)gP(e) , where gP(e) = P(v,QS,v, E′ ∪ e) −
P(v,QS,v, E′) is the path probability gain of e. The path
probability gain gP(e) quantifies the increase inP(v,QS,v, E′),
caused by the selection of e. Thus, the selected edge has
small PRH and contributes significantly to lowering the
activation probability Pv . To ensure that gP(e) is positive,
we reconstruct G˜v in step 5. Next, e is added into E′ (step
6), and the process is repeated if the activation probability
P(v,QS,v, E)−P(v,QS,v, E′) exceeds maxP . Last, E′ is
deleted from G and returned (steps 7-8).
Theorem 4 shows that GDE finds a solution with PRH
at most 1 + ln(λ) times larger than that of the optimal so-
lution, where λ depends on the PRH and path probability
gain of the selected edges. The proof easily follows from
[41] (omitted).
Theorem 4 Let E′ be the output of GDE and E′OPT be
the optimal solution to PEDSSC . It holds that PRH(E′) ≤
(1 + ln(λ)) · PRH(E′OPT ), where λ is the minimum of: (I)
the maximum ratio gP(e1)gP(e) , (II)
PRH(e`)
gP(e`)
/PRH(e1)gP(e1) , and (III)
P(v,QS,v,E′)
gP(e`)
, where e1 (resp., e`) is the edge that was first
(resp., last) added into E′, and e is an edge in E′ \ e1.
GDE needsO(|Ev| · |E′| ·T ) time, whereEv is the edge
set of G˜v , E′ ⊆ Ev is the set of deleted edges, and T is the
maximum time needed to compute gP(e). Specifically, step
4 is executed O(|E′|) times, and step 5 needs O(|Ev| · T )
time. In practice, T << |Ev| because the activation pro-
babilities are computed using small subgraphs of G˜v (see
Section 2.3).
6 Algorithms for multiple vulnerable nodes
This section presents AGDE and IGDE, which address the
PED problem when there are multiple vulnerable nodes.
Aggregate Greedy Delete Edges (AGDE). AGDE is an
approximation algorithm, which reduces the activation pro-
babilities of multiple vulnerable nodes simultaneously. The
main idea is to model PED as an SSC problem and to base
AGDE on the algorithm of [41]. However, the condition (II)
of PED (i.e., Pv ≤ maxP after the deletion of E′, for each
vulnerable node v) involves multiple constraints, whereas in
SSC there is a single constraint, F (S) ≥ b (see Definition
1). Therefore, to model PED as SSC, we need to replace the
multiple constraints of PED with a single, aggregate con-
straint which is equivalent to them (i.e., the aggregate con-
straint is satisfied if and only if all constraints in the condi-
tion (II) of PED are satisfied).
To formulate the aggregate constraint, we observe that:
(I) The constraint for each vulnerable node v in the con-
dition (II) of PED can be written as P(v,QS,v, E) −
P(v,QS,v, E′) ≤ maxP , or equivalently as
P(v,QS,v, E′) ≥ P(v,QS,v, E)−maxP (6)
(II) The constraint in Eq. 6 can be written as
min(P(v,QS,v , E′),P(v,QS,v ,E)−maxP) =
P(v,QS,v , E)−maxP
(7)
To see this, note that themin in Eq. 7 reduces (truncates)
P(v,QS,v, E′) to P(v,QS,v, E)−maxP , if and only if
P(v,QS,v, E′) ≥ P(v,QS,v, E) − maxP is satisfied.
Thus, we can check whether the constraint in Eq. 6 is
satisfied, by checking whether the value of min in Eq. 7
is equal to the constant P(v,QS,v, E)−maxP . This al-
lows to aggregate the constraints of all vulnerable nodes
into a single constraint, as shown in step (III) below.
(III) All constraintsP(v,QS,v, E′) ≥ P(v,QS,v, E)−maxP
in the condition (II) of PED can be replaced by the ag-
gregate constraint∑
v
min(P(v,QS,v , E′),P(v,QS,v , E)−maxP) =∑
v
(P(v,QS,v , E)−maxP)
(8)
To see this, note that the constraint in Eq. 8 is satisfied,
if and only if each constraint in Eq. 7 is satisfied, which
implies that all constraints in the condition (II) of PED
are satisfied.
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We now present a formulation of the PED problem, which
uses the aggregate constraint in Eq. 8. For clarity, the pro-
blem in this formulation is referred to as PEDAggr and the
term
∑
vmin(P(v,QS,v, E′),P(v,QS,v, E) − maxP) in
Eq. 8 is denoted with P(D,∪v∈DQS,v, E′) and referred to
as aggregate path probability.
Problem 3 (PEDAggr) Let S ⊆ V be the subset of seed
nodes,D ⊆ V be the subset of vulnerable nodes, and G˜D =
∪v∈DG˜v be the activation graph of D. Given a threshold
maxP in [0, 1] and the PRH of each edge of G˜D, find an
edge subset E′ ⊆ E of G˜D such that:
(I) PRH(E′) is minimum, and
(II) P(D,∪v∈DQS,v, E′) =
∑
v∈D
(P(v,QS,v, E)−maxP).
Note that PEDAggr contains a single constraint and that
the aggregate path probability P(D,∪v∈DQS,v, E′) is sub-
modular (this easily follows from the submodularity of
P(v,QS,v, E′)). Thus, PEDAggr can be reduced to SSC (the
reduction is omitted because it is similar to that of Theorem
3) and be approximated by using the algorithm of [41] as the
basis of our AGDE algorithm.
In what follows, we present the AGDE algorithm. As
can be seen in the pseudocode, the algorithm is applied to the
activation graph G˜D and iteratively selects the edge with the
minimum ratio PRH(e)gPD (e)
(step 5), where gPD (e) is the aggre-
gate path probability gain, defined asP(D,∪v∈DQS,v, E′∪
e)−P(D,∪v∈DQS,v, E′). The process is repeated until the
condition (II) of PEDAggr holds. Note that this condition
holds, in the worst case when E′ contains all edges of G˜D.
Thus, AGDE will always terminate.
Algorithm: AGDE
Input: Graph G, activation graph G˜D , threshold maxP , set of
vulnerable nodes D, PageRank distribution PR(G), restart
probability α
Output: Set of edges E′
1 foreach edge e = (u, u′) of G˜D do
2 PRH(e)← (1− α) · PR(u,G)|n+(u)|
3 E′ ← ∅
4 while P(D,∪v∈DQS,v , E′) <
∑
v∈D(P(v,QS,v , E)−maxP)
do
5 Reconstruct G˜D and find an edge e of G˜D s.t. gPD (e) > 0
and PRH(e)
gPD (e)
is minimum
6 E′ ← E′ ∪ e
7 Delete E′ from G
8 return E′
Theorem 5 shows that AGDE finds a solution withPRH
at most 1 + ln(λD) times larger than that of the optimal so-
lution to PEDAggr, where λD depends on the PRH and
aggregate path probability gain of the selected edges. The
proof easily follows from [41] (omitted).
Theorem 5 Let E′ be the output of AGDE and E′OPT be
the optimal solution to PEDAggr. It holds that PRH(E′) ≤
(1 + ln(λD)) · PRH(E′OPT ), where λD is the minimum
of: (I) the maximum ratio gPD (e1)gPD (e)
, (II) PRH(e`)gPD (e`)
/PRH(e1)gPD (e1)
,
and (III) P(D,∪v∈DQS,v,E
′)
gPD (e`)
, where e1 (resp., e`) is the edge
that was first (resp., last) added into E′, and e is an edge in
E′ \ e1.
Clearly, AGDE needs O(|E| · |E′| · TD) time, where E
is the edge set of G˜D, E′ ⊆ E is the set of deleted edges,
and TD is the maximum time needed to compute gPD .
Iterative Greedy Delete Edges (IGDE). As can be seen
in the pseudocode, IGDE sorts the vulnerable nodes, in de-
creasing order of activation probability, and applies GDE to
the activation graph G˜v of one vulnerable node v at a time.
This heuristic improves efficiency, because: (I) G˜v con-
tains a much smaller number of edges than the activation
graph of all vulnerable nodes to which AGDE is applied,
and (II) the edge subset E′v that is deleted in an iteration is
not considered again. However, this reduces the number of
explored solutions. Therefore, vulnerable nodes with large
activation probabilityP(v,QS,v, E) are dealt with first, when
more edges are available for deletion.
Algorithm: IGDE
Input: Graph G, threshold maxP , set of vulnerable nodes D,
activation graph G˜v for each v ∈ D, PageRank distribution
PR(G), restart probability α
Output: Set of edges E′
1 sort each v in D in decreasing order of activation probability
P(v,QS,v , E)
2 E′ ← ∅; Gtmp ← G
3 foreach v in D do
4 if P(v,QS,v , E)− P(v,QS,v , E′) > maxP then
5 E′v ← GDE(G, G˜v ,maxP, PR(Gtmp), α)
6 foreach v in D do
7 Update G˜v to reflect the deletion of E′v
8 E′ ← E′ ∪ E′v
9 return E′
Note that each vulnerable node v is considered once, be-
cause P(v,QS,v, E′) cannot decrease in the next iterations
(see Theorem 2). Thus, after the loop of step 3 terminates,
the condition (II) of PED holds, and the subset of edgesE′ is
returned (step 9). Furthermore, GDE is applied to the Page-
Rank distribution of the original graph (step 5), so that edge
deletion does not affect the PRH computation in GDE.
IGDE needsO(
∑
v∈D(|Ev| · |E′| ·T + |D| · |Ev|)) time.
Specifically, step 5 takes O(|Ev| · |E′| ·T ) time, while steps
6 and 7 take O(|D| · |Ev|) time.
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7 Efficiency optimization using lazy edge selection
In this section, we propose a lazy edge selection technique
that is used to improve the efficiency of our algorithms, wit-
hout affecting the quality of their solutions. The versions of
GDE, AGDE, and IGDE that implement the technique are
referred to as GDELAZY, AGDELAZY, and IGDELAZY, re-
spectively. The technique is based on the submodularity of
the functions P(v,QS,v, E′) and P(D,∪v∈DQS,v, E′),
which are used in the edge selection criteria of our algo-
rithms. Our technique is inspired by Accelerated Greedy (also
referred to as Lazy Greedy) algorithm [34], which was revie-
wed in Section 2.4.
Note that there are other algorithms [16, 35] that can be
used instead of Accelerated Greedy, in order to find a subset
U ′ ⊆ U with approximately maximum f(U ′) and size r.
However, our lazy edge selection technique is not based on
them. This is because they require efficiently computing the
gain of two element subsets simultaneously [16], which is
not feasible in our case, or because they cannot maintain the
approximation ratio of our algorithms [35], since they are
designed for the submodular maximization problem [36].
The lazy edge selection technique maintains a priority
queue, which stores the ratio between PRH and the gain gP
for each edge in the case of GDELAZY and IGDELAZY (re-
spectively, gPD in the case of AGDELAZY), and it is sorted
in increasing order. In the first iteration, the gains are com-
puted with E′ = ∅ and the top entry is retrieved from the
priority queue. The top entry corresponds to the edge with
the minimum ratio (i.e., the “best” edge in the current itera-
tion). Then, the edge corresponding to the top entry is added
intoE′, and the top entry is removed from the queue. In each
subsequent iteration, the top entry of the queue is retrieved
and its ratio is updated to reflect the current E′. If the top
entry remains on the top of the queue after the update, it is
removed from the queue and its corresponding edge e is ad-
ded into E′. Otherwise, the current top entry is updated and
the process is repeated. Thus, lazy edge selection is similar
to Accelerated Greedy in that it exploits the submodularity
of the gain to avoid updating all entries of the priority queue.
In the following, we explain how the lazy edge selection
technique exploits the submodularity of the gain to avoid up-
dating all entries of the priority queue. Let E′i be the set of
selected edges by the lazy edge selection strategy in itera-
tion i, gi be the gain for an edge in iteration i (e.g., the gain
gP in the case of GDELAZY), and e /∈ E′i be an edge whose
corresponding entry remained on the top of the queue after
the update in the next iteration i + 1. Since the entry cor-
responding to e was on the top of the priority queue before
the update, PRH(E
′
i∪{e})
gi(e)
≤ PRH(E′i∪{e′})gi(e′) , for each edge
e′ /∈ E′i ∪ {e}. That is, in iteration i, e was the best availa-
ble edge to select, except the selected edges in E′i. Since the
entry corresponding to the edge e remained on the top of the
priority queue after the update, it holds that
PRH(E′i+1 ∪ {e})
gi+1(e)
≤ PRH(E
′
i ∪ {e′})
gi(e′)
, (9)
for each edge e′ /∈ E′i ∪ {e}. Note also that PRH(E′i ∪
{e′}) ≤ PRH(E′i+1 ∪ {e′}), due to the monotonicity of
PRH , and gi(e′) ≥ gi+1(e′), due to the submodularity of
the gain function. Thus, PRH(E
′
i∪{e′})
gi(e′)
≤ PRH(E
′
i+1∪{e′})
gi+1(e′)
,
and from Eq. 9 we obtain PRH(E
′
i+1∪{e})
gi(e)
≤ PRH(E
′
i+1∪{e′})
gi+1(e′)
,
for each edge e′ /∈ E′i ∪ {e}. That is, e is the best edge to
select in iteration i + 1, when the entry corresponding to e
remains on the top of the queue after the update. Thus, any
edge e′ would not be selected and its corresponding entry
does not need updating.
In practice, lazy edge improves efficiency substantially,
since there are many entries that do not need updating and
the updating is costly, while it does not affect quality, since
the same edges are selected by the algorithms, irrespectively
of whether lazy edge selection is employed.
Algorithm: GDELAZY
Input: Graph G, activation graph G˜v , threshold maxP , PageRank
distribution PR(G), restart probability α
Output: Set of edges E′
1 E′ ← ∅
2 Q← empty priority queue sorted in increasing order
3 foreach edge e = (u, u′) of G˜v do
4 PRH(e)← (1− α) · PR(u)|n+(u)|
5 Q← PRH(e)
gP(e)
6 while P(v,QS,v , E)− P(v,QS,v , E′) > maxP do
7 Reconstruct G˜v
8 if E′ = ∅ then
9 e← the edge corresponding to the top entry of Q
10 else
11 do
12 Update the top entry of Q using the current E′
13 while the top entry of Q changes
14 e← the edge corresponding to the top entry of Q
15 Remove the top entry of Q
16 E′ ← E′ ∪ e
17 Delete E′ from G
18 return E′
As can be seen in the pseudocode of GDELAZY, the al-
gorithm starts by initializing the priority queue with the ra-
tio between PRH and the gain gP of each edge, which is
computed with E′ = ∅ (steps 1 to 5). Then, GDELAZY ite-
ratively selects the edge e with the minimum gain, as long
as the activation probability P(v,QS,v, E)−P(v,QS,v, E′)
exceeds maxP (steps 6 to 14). In the first iteration, e corre-
sponds to the top entry of the priority queue (steps 8 to 9).
In any subsequent iteration, the edge corresponds to the top
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entry of the priority queue, after updating the queue using
the current E′ (steps 10 to 14). Next, the algorithm removes
the top entry of the priority queue and adds the edge e into
E′ (steps 15 to 16). Since GDELAZY selects the edge with
the minimum ratio in each iteration, it produces a solution
with the same PRH as GDE.
The pseudocode of AGDELAZY and IGDELAZY can be
derived similarly (omitted).
8 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our algorithms in terms of their
effectiveness and efficiency. Since existing methods are not
applicable to the PED problem, we compared our algorithms
against baselines that use different edge selection criteria,
and against the optimal, exhaustive method, BRUTEFORCE,
which examines all edge subsets. In addition, we show that
PRH is an effective and efficient heuristic to capture the
change to the PageRank scores, caused by edge deletion.
Setup and datasets. To quantify the impact of edge dele-
tion, we used: (I) PRH , (II) the L1 distance, (III) the per-
centage of deleted edges, and (IV) the Kendall τb correlation
(Kτb). Kτb captures changes to the ranking of all nodes,
with respect to their PageRank scores [5]. A Kτb value of 1
implies no change to the ranking and larger values are pre-
ferred.
We implemented all algorithms in C++ and applied them
to the following real datasets: cit-HepPh (Ph), Wiki-vote
(Wiki), and Polblogs (Pol). The Ph dataset is available at
http://snap.stanford.edu/data and represents a High
Energy Physics citation graph. Each node u in the data-
set corresponds to a paper and each edge (u, u′) represents
that the paper corresponding to the node u cited the paper
corresponding to the node u′. The Wiki dataset is availa-
ble at http://snap.stanford.edu/data and represents
a whom-trusts-whom graph from Wikipedia. Each node u
in the dataset represents a Wikipedia user, and each edge
(u, u′) represents that the user corresponding to the node
u voted for the promotion of the user corresponding to the
node u′ to become an administrator. The Pol dataset is avai-
lable at http://www-personal.umich.edu/˜mejn/ and
represents a graph of weblogs on US politics. Each node u
in the dataset represents a weblog, each edge (u, u′) repre-
sents a hyperlink from the weblog corresponding to node
u to the weblog corresponding to node u′. We also used
two synthetic datasets, AB and ER, which were generated
by the Albert-Barabasi and the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model, respecti-
vely. These models generate random graphs with different
structural properties that are common in real networks (e.g.,
power-law degree distribution for the Albert-Barabasi mo-
del, and small diameter for the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model). This
allows us to test our approach in a wider range of settings.
Of note, random graphs generated by the Albert-Barabasi
and the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model were used in other works on in-
fluence diffusion optimization [11, 25]. Table 1 summarizes
the characteristics of each dataset and its default values for
maxP , |S| (# of seeds), and |D| (# of vulnerable nodes).
BRUTEFORCE does not scale to real datasets. Thus, it was
applied to 1000 datasets, which have 16 nodes and 28 edges
on average and were generated by the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model.
Dataset |V | |E| (avg, max) in-deg. maxP |S| |D|
Ph 34546 421578 (24.3, 846) 0.1 200 50
Wiki 7115 103689 (13.7, 452) 0.1 75 20
Pol 1490 19090 (11.9, 305) 0.1 500 20
AB 111150 500000 (9, 99907) 0.01 500 5
ER 5000 49917 (9.98, 24) 0.01 50 20
Table 1: Characteristics of datasets and default values for
threshold maxP , number of seeds |S|, and number of vul-
nerable nodes |D|.
All edge probabilities were assigned by the uniform me-
thod (i.e., each incoming edge to u has edge probability
1
|n−(u)| ) [11, 24] and the threshold h was set to 10
−3, as
in [17] (recall from Section 2.3 that Pu is estimated based
on paths with path probability at least equal to h). The vulne-
rable nodes were: (I) selected randomly among the top-10%
of nodes with the largest in-degree, in Ph, Wiki, Pol, and ER,
and (II) the 5 nodes with the largest in-degree, in all other
datasets. This excludes nodes that are easy to deal with. To
find the seeds, we considered each vulnerable node v and ite-
ratively selected random paths of length at least 2 that end at
v, until Pv ≥ min(r ·maxP, 1), where r ≥ 1 is a random
integer. The start nodes of these paths were used as seeds.
Since there were many other paths from seeds to vulnerable
nodes, the activation graphs were large. All experiments ran
on an Intel Xeon at 2.4Ghz with 12Gb RAM.
Quality of approximation. We demonstrate that AGDE
finds near-optimal solutions, by comparing it to BRUTE-
FORCE. Fig. 5a shows the ratio between thePRH for AGDE
and for BRUTEFORCE, as well as the approximation ratio
1 + ln(λD), when maxP = 0.2, for all 1000 datasets (sor-
ted in decreasing PRH). The ratio is 1 for 70% of the da-
tasets, 1.04 on average, and at most 1.7. The approximation
ratio is 2.6 on average and at most 6. Thus, AGDE produced
solutions that are close to optimal, and the ratio of AGDE
to BRUTEFORCE was much lower than the approximation
ratio. We omit the results for AGDELAZY, since it produced
the same solutions with AGDE (recall that the lazy edge
selection technique does not affect the quality of solutions).
Effectiveness. We demonstrate that AGDE and IGDE do
not substantially affect the information propagation proper-
ties of the graph and that they delete a small number of
edges. We compared our methods with two baselines: (I)
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Fig. 5: (a) AGDE/BRUTEFORCE with respect to PRH and approximation ratio of AGDE for different random graphs.
AGDE/BRUTEFORCE is defined as the ratio between the PRH of the solution generated by AGDE and the optimal solution
generated by BRUTEFORCE. The approximation ratio of AGDE is defined as 1 + ln(λD) (see Section 6). (b) PRH vs.
threshold maxP , for the Wiki dataset. (c) PRH vs. threshold maxP , for the Pol dataset. (d) L1 distance vs. threshold
maxP , for the Wiki dataset. (e) L1 distance vs. threshold maxP , for the Pol dataset.
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Fig. 6: (a) Kendall τb correlation (Kτb) vs. threshold maxP , for the Wiki dataset. Kτb captures changes to the ranking of
all nodes, with respect to their PageRank scores, and larger Kτb scores imply smaller changes to the ranking. (b) Percentage
of deleted edges vs. threshold maxP , for the Wiki dataset. (c) L1 distance vs. number of seeds |S|, for the Ph dataset. (d)
L1 distance vs. number of seeds |S|, for the Pol dataset. (e) Percentage of deleted edges vs. number of seeds |S|, for the Ph
dataset.
BPRH , which selects the edge with the minimum PRH , and (II) BPGain, which selects the edge with the maximum
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Fig. 7: (a) L1 distance vs. number of vulnerable nodes |D|, for the Wiki dataset. (b) Percentage of deleted edges vs. number
of vulnerable nodes |D|, for the Wiki dataset.
aggregate path probability gain. Both baselines are based on
AGDE but do not offer approximation guarantees. We omit
the results for AGDELAZY and IGDELAZY, since they produ-
ced the same solutions with AGDE and IGDE, respectively.
Figs. 5b and 5c show the PRH , for varying maxP .
The PRH decreases as maxP increases, because the re-
quired reduction in activation probabilities becomes smal-
ler. AGDE was the best method, and the PRH for IGDE
was slightly larger. The baselines performed much worse,
because BPRH deleted edges that did not reduce the activa-
tion probabilities of vulnerable nodes and BPGain deleted
edges with large PRH .
Figs. 5d and 5e show the results for the L1 distance,
which follows the same trend as PRH . This suggests that
minimizing PRH helps preserving the PageRank distribu-
tion. AGDE and IGDE performed similarly with respect to
Kτb and better than the baselines (see Fig. 6a). Furthermore,
AGDE and IGDE deleted at most 0.04% more edges than
BPGain, which aims to minimize the number of deleted ed-
ges (see Fig. 6b).
Next, we measured effectiveness, for varying |S|, using
seed sets of increasing size, whose elements were contained
in all larger sets. Figs. 6c and 6d show that the L1 distance
increases with |S|. This is because the activation probabili-
ties of vulnerable nodes, before edge deletion, are higher for
large seed sets. They also show that AGDE and IGDE out-
performed both baselines. Furthermore, AGDE and IGDE
deleted at most 0.01% more edges than BPGain (see Fig.
6e).
We also measured effectiveness, for varying |D| (# of
vulnerable nodes). AGDE and IGDE performed similarly
and significantly better than both baselines, with respect to
theL1 distance (see Fig. 7a). Furthermore, our methods dele-
ted at most 0.5% more edges than BPGain (see Fig. 7b).
Thus, AGDE and IGDE preserved the information pro-
pagation properties of the graph much better than both ba-
selines, and they deleted a similar number of edges with the
BPGain baseline, which aims to minimize the number of de-
leted edges.
Efficiency comparison with baselines. We demonstrate
that AGDE and IGDE scale well with |S|, |D|, and |E|, and
that they are more efficient than the fastest baselines, BPRH
and BPGain. In addition, we show that IGDE is substanti-
ally more efficient than AGDE.
Fig. 8a shows that AGDE and IGDE scaled better than
linear (sublinearly) with |S|. However, IGDE was up to 4
times faster, as it considers seeds contained in the activation
graph of one vulnerable node at a time. Fig. 8b shows that
IGDE scaled sublinearly with |D|, and it was up to two or-
ders of magnitude faster than AGDE. This is because the
edges deleted in an iteration of IGDE affected many acti-
vation graphs. Fig. 8c shows that AGDE and IGDE scaled
sublinearly with |E|, and that IGDE was up to one order of
magnitude faster. The baselines scaled similarly to AGDE,
and the results for the ER dataset were similar (omitted).
Efficiency benefit of lazy edge selection. We demonstrate
that the lazy edge selection strategy substantially improves
the efficiency of both AGDE and IGDE. To show the im-
provement, we report: (I) the runtime of AGDELAZY and
IGDELAZY, and (II) the Average savings brought by lazy
edge selection. For AGDELAZY, the Average savings mea-
sure is computed as the percentage of edges of the activa-
tion graph G˜D whose ratio is not updated, averaged over
all iterations except the first one. We exclude the first itera-
tion from the computation, because, in this iteration, the lazy
edge selection computes the ratios of all edges (see Section
7), which implies that the savings are always zero. To com-
pute Average savings for IGDELAZY, we perform the same
computation (i.e., calculate the percentage of edges whose
ratio is not updated, averaged over all iterations except the
first one) on the activation graph G˜v of each vulnerable node
v, and then compute the average of all results.
We first report the runtime. Fig. 9a shows that AGDELAZY
and IGDELAZY were faster than both AGDE and IGDE, for
all tested |S| values. Specifically, AGDELAZY was at least
37% and up to 600% faster than AGDE, while IGDELAZY
was at least 49% and up to 87% faster than IGDE. In addi-
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Fig. 8: (a) Runtime vs. number of seeds |S|, for the Wiki dataset. (b) Runtime vs. number of vulnerable nodes |D|, for the
Wiki dataset. (c) Runtime vs. number of edges |E| in the graph, for the AB dataset.
tion, AGDELAZY and IGDELAZY scaled better with |S| than
AGDE and IGDE.
Figs. 9b and 9c show that lazy edge selection improves
the runtime of both AGDELAZY and IGDELAZY, for all tes-
ted |D| values. For example, when the Wiki dataset was used
(Fig. 9b), AGDELAZY was at least 146% and up to 814%
faster than AGDE, while IGDELAZY was at least 15% and
up to 40% faster than IGDE. In addition, AGDELAZY and
IGDELAZY scaled better with |D| than AGDE and IGDE.
These results show that the lazy edge selection strategy
improves the runtime and scalability of both AGDE and
IGDE. This is because it avoids computing the ratio of a
large percentage of edges after edge deletion, which is an
expensive operation, particularly for large activation graphs.
To demonstrate the percentage of such edges, we report
the Average savings measure in Fig. 10. Figs. 10a, 10b, and
10c correspond to the experiments of Figs. 9a, 9b, and 9c,
respectively. As can be seen in Figs. 10a, 10b, and 10c, the
Average savings for AGDELAZY were at least 96%. Thus, the
lazy edge selection strategy updated the ratio of a small per-
centage of edges (i.e., one of the topmost edges in the prio-
rity queue remained on the top of the queue after the update),
which explains the much better efficiency of AGDELAZY
compared to AGDE. The Average savings for IGDELAZY
were at least 57% and up to 95%. However, they were lower
than those of AGDELAZY. This is because in some iterations
IGDE was applied to very small activation graphs of fewer
than 5 edges, for which lazy edge deletion had to update
most of their edges, resulting is small savings.
Threshold h. We demonstrate the impact of h on the L1
distance and on the runtime of AGDE and IGDE. Figs. 11a
and 11b show that the L1 distance decreased by 0.07% on
average, for h ≤ 10−3 and substantially for larger h values.
The runtime of both methods decreased significantly as h
increases. Thus, setting h to 10−3, as suggested in [17], al-
lows estimating the activation probabilities accurately and
efficiently. The results for AGDELAZY and IGDELAZY were
qualitatively similar to those of AGDE and IGDE (omit-
ted).
Benefit of using PRH vs. the L1 distance. We demon-
strate the effectiveness and efficiency of using PRH as a
heuristic to capture the change to the PageRank scores, cau-
sed by edge deletion. We compared our algorithms against
BL1/PGain, a baseline that implements the greedy approach
based on the L1 distance (see Section 3).
Figs. 12a, 12b, and 12c show the results with respect to
PRH , L1 distance, and Kτb, for varying maxP , respecti-
vely. BL1/PGain produced the same solution when applied
using maxP ≤ 0.1. Furthermore, the solution was worse
than the solutions of AGDE and IGDE, with respect to all
tested measures. Specifically, the PRH for BL1/PGain was
2.7 times larger on average than that of AGDE and IGDE,
and the results in terms of L1 distance and Kτb were quali-
tatively similar. In addition, BL1/PGain deleted on average
1.5% and 1.6% more edges than AGDE and IGDE, respecti-
vely (see Fig. 12d).
Figs. 12e and 12f show the results for varying |S| and
|D|, respectively, with respect to the L1 distance. The L1
distance for BL1/PGain was 5 times larger than that of AGDE
and IGDE, on average. In addition, BL1/PGain was several
orders of magnitude slower than our algorithms, because it
computes the PageRank distribution of the graph after de-
leting each edge, in order to select the best edge in each
iteration. For example, BL1/PGain required 12 hours when
applied to Pol with |D| = 50, while IGDE needed 90 se-
conds.
Thus, PRH is a more effective and efficient measure to
avoid changes to the PageRank distribution compared to the
L1 distance.
Benefit of computing PRH on G. We demonstrate that
computing the PRH of every edge in a subset E′ on the
graph G helps efficiency and does not impact effectiveness.
We compared AGDE with BPRHupd/PGain, a baseline that
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Fig. 9: Comparison of AGDELAZY and IGDELAZY, which incorporate lazy edge selection, with AGDE and IGDE in terms
of runtime. (a) Runtime vs. number of seeds |S|, for the Wiki dataset. (b) Runtime vs. number of vulnerable nodes |D|, for
the Wiki dataset. (c) Runtime vs. number of vulnerable nodes |D|, for the Pol dataset.
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Fig. 11: (a) L1 distance vs. threshold h, for the Wiki dataset. (b) Runtime vs. threshold h, for the Wiki dataset.
computes the PRH of an edge e on a graph G′e, produced
from G by deleting all edges that were added into E′ before
e. The baseline is based on AGDE, because AGDE com-
putes the PRH of more edge subsets (potential solutions)
than IGDE, and this allows comparing the PRH computa-
tion strategies on more subsets. We repeated all experiments
of the effectiveness subsection above and found that AGDE
and BPRHupd/PGain produced the same solutions, except
in the experiments of Figs. 5c and 6d.
Tables 2 and 3 correspond to the experiments of Fig.
5c and 6d, respectively, and show the PRH as well as the
precision and recall of the solutions of AGDE and of the
BPRHupd/PGain baseline. The precision is computed as
|E′AGDE∩E′B |
|E′AGDE| , and the recall is computed as
|E′AGDE∩E′B |
|E′B | , where
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Fig. 12: Comparison with the BL1/PGain baseline, which implements the greedy approach based on the L1 distance (see
Section 3), on the Pol dataset. (a) PRH vs. threshold maxP . (b) L1 distance vs. threshold maxP . (c) Kendall τb correlation
(Kτb) vs. threshold maxP . (d) Percentage of deleted edges vs. threshold maxP . (e) L1 distance vs. number of seeds |S|. (f)
L1 distance vs. number of vulnerable nodes |D|.
E′AGDE is the solution of AGDE and E
′
B is the solution of
BPRHupd/PGain.
maxP Precision Recall PRH(E′AGDE) PRH(E′B)
0.01 1 1 4.7·10−3 4.7·10−3
0.025 0.996 0.996 4.235·10−3 4.236·10−3
0.05 1 1 3.37·10−3 3.37·10−3
0.1 1 1 2.477·10−3 2.477·10−3
0.25 1 1 1.298·10−3 1.298·10−3
Table 2: Comparison of AGDE with the BPRHupd/PGain
baseline, on the Pol dataset, for varying threshold maxP
in [0.01, 0.25]. BPRHupd/PGain computes the PRH of an
edge e on a graphG′e, which is produced fromG by deleting
all edges that were added into E′ before e.
|S| Precision Recall PRH(E′AGDE) PRH(E′B)
10 0.991 0.991 7.881·10−4 7.882·10−4
25 0.978 0.970 1.292·10−3 1.293·10−3
50 0.978 0.972 1.774·10−3 1.775·10−3
100 1 1 1.298·10−3 1.298·10−3
Table 3: Comparison of AGDE with the BPRHupd/PGain
baseline, on the Pol dataset, for varying number of seeds
|S| in [10, 100]. BPRHupd/PGain computes the PRH of an
edge e on a graphG′e, which is produced fromG by deleting
all edges that were added into E′ before e.
As can be seen in Tables 2 and 3, the precision and re-
call are both equal to 1 (i.e., AGDE and BPRHupd/PGain
produced the same solution), or close to 1. The difference
between the solutions was small and occurred because the
algorithms broke ties differently. Specifically, the solutions
differed in at most 5 edges and had similar PRH . However,
AGDE was up to 84% faster, because it avoids recompu-
ting the PageRank distribution of the graph. Thus, our PRH
computation strategy is both effective and efficient.
9 Related work
Our work is related to methods that limit the diffusion of
information in order to minimize the spread (expected num-
ber of nodes that are activated by a seed set). These methods
can be split into two classes. The first class contains met-
hods that modify the graph and is reviewed in Section 9.1.
The second class contains methods that initiate the diffu-
sion of information of opposite content and is reviewed in
Section 9.2. In addition, our work is related to methods that
modify the graph to address optimization problems related
to PageRank and robustness. These methods are discussed
in Section 9.3.
9.1 Minimizing spread by graph modification
Methods that modify the graph aim to minimize the spread
either directly, or indirectly by optimizing a graph property.
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To minimize the spread directly, there are heuristics that ap-
ply node [45, 46] or edge [26, 28] deletion under different
diffusion models, such as the Independent Cascade (IC) mo-
del (e.g., [45, 46]), the Linear Threshold (LT) model (e.g.,
[26]), and the discrete dynamic systems model [28]. For ex-
ample, the heuristics developed in [45,46] aim to find a node
subset of given size whose removal from the graph minimi-
zes the spread. These heuristics employ the dominator tree
of the graph [32] to reduce the search space and improve
efficiency. There is also an approximation algorithm [25] to
minimize the spread directly. The algorithm aims to delete
an edge subset of given size under the LT model, and it is ba-
sed on the the supermodularity of the spread function after
edge deletion 3.
Methods for minimizing the spread indirectly were pro-
posed in [15, 21, 38, 40, 44]. These methods delete edges
[40, 44] or nodes [15, 38] aiming to minimize graph proper-
ties that control the spread, such as the leading eigenvalue
of the adjacency matrix [38, 40], the node degree [44], and
the node betweeness (average number of shortest paths that
pass through a node or edge) [15].
All methods that modify the graph follow the collective
approach, which requires reducing the activation probabili-
ties of all nodes as much as possible. In addition, they as-
sume that deleting each edge has the same impact on the in-
formation propagation properties of the graph. Thus, these
methods are not applicable to our problem, as discussed in
Introduction.
9.2 Minimizing spread by diffusing information of opposite
content
Methods that minimize the spread of undesirable (negative)
information, by diffusing information of opposite content
(positive information) were proposed in [7, 20]. These met-
hods select seeds which diffuse the positive information, in
order to prevent the diffusion of negative information to the
largest (expected) number of nodes.
Specifically, the work of [7] proposes three heuristics for
selecting a subset of nodes of given size, under an extended
IC model. The first heuristic selects the nodes with the lar-
gest degree as seeds, the second heuristic selects nodes that
are expected to be activated early as seeds, and the third heu-
ristic selects nodes that would activate the highest number of
nodes after being activated early as seeds. On the other hand,
the work of [20] proposes a heuristic for selecting a subset of
nodes of given size, under an extended LT model. The crux
3 This function can be written as
∑
v∈G(P(v,QS,v , E)) −∑
v∈G(P(v,QS,v , E′)), which is supermodular. This is because: (I)∑
v∈G P(v,QS,v , E) is constant, (II)
∑
v∈G(P(v,QS,v , E′)) is sub-
modular (as a sum of submodular functions [27]), which implies that
−∑v∈G(P(v,QS,v , E′)) is supermodular [25], and (III) the sum of
a constant and a supermodular function is supermodular [27].
of the heuristic is the approximate computation of spread
using directed acyclic graphs around seeds, which improves
efficiency.
The work of [37] considered a different setting than that
of [7, 20], in which the spread of the negative information
must be limited to at most a threshold within a given time
period. In addition, it proposed heuristics for the IC and the
LT model. The heuristics first find the community structure
of the graph and then perform seed selection in each commu-
nity independently. This strategy can substantially improve
efficiency when the graph has relatively small communities.
The problems considered in the methods of [7,20,37] are
fundamentally different from PED. First, these problems re-
quire selecting a set of nodes as seeds. On the other hand,
PED assumes that the set of seeds is given, and it requires
selecting a set of edges. Second, these problems do not dis-
tinguish between vulnerable and non-vulnerable nodes. On
the other hand, PED considers a set of vulnerable nodes and
seeks to limit the diffusion of information to them, while not
affecting the information propagation to other nodes. There-
fore, the methods proposed in [7, 20, 37] cannot be applied
to deal with the PED problem.
9.3 Graph modification for PageRank and robustness
manipulation
Our work is also related to approaches that modify the graph
to address optimization problems related to PageRank. These
approaches perform edge deletion [13, 22] or node aggre-
gation [33] to improve the PageRank scores of nodes, or to
speed up the computation of PageRank [18]. In addition, our
work is related to approaches for degrading graph robustness
(resilience to changes), in the sense that they also modify the
graph to prevent the communication between nodes. Appro-
aches for degrading graph robustness perform node or edge
deletion and include heuristics [1, 23], as well as approx-
imation algorithms [8]. However, none of the aforementio-
ned approaches [1,8,13,18,22,23,33] considers information
diffusion.
10 Conclusions
Existing works for limiting the diffusion of information by
edge deletion assume that the diffusing information can af-
fect all nodes and that deleting each edge has the same im-
pact on the information propagation properties of the graph.
In this work, we introduced an approach that lifts these re-
strictive assumptions. Our approach reduces the activation
probabilities of vulnerable nodes to at most a specified thres-
hold, and it applies edge deletion while preserving the in-
formation propagation properties of the graph, by avoiding
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changes to its PageRank distribution. We proposed a mea-
sure to capture these changes, and based on the measure we
formulated the PED problem. To deal with the problem, we
developed an effective approximation algorithm and an effi-
cient heuristic. In addition, we have proposed a lazy edge
selection strategy and experimentally shown its ability to
substantially speed up our algorithm and heuristic.
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